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The Fifth Amendment1 of the United States
Constitution prohibits governmental taking of
private property for public use without just
compensation. While such a taking is plainly
evident when the government physically
invades or appropriates private property, the
advent of the administrative state and its reg-
ulatory schemes has introduced an amorphous
area of takings based on overreaching land use
restrictions. The Endangered Species Act2
(ESA) creates such a regulatory scheme, where
the government’s interest in protecting threat-
ened species clashes with property owners’
interest in using and deriving economic bene-
fit from their land. However, despite the hun-
dreds of takings cases on the dockets, no fed-
eral court has issued a final ruling in favor of a
takings claim under the ESA.
There are several reasons for this dearth of
takings cases under the Endangered Species
Act. The Act provides for incidental take per-
mits and habitat conservation plans that allow
a landowner to take species without violating
the law. The availability of such lesser restric-
tions suggest a landowner must apply for and
be denied an incidental take permit or habitat
conservation plan before that owner’s taking
claim can be ripe for court review.  Thus, inci-
dental take permits and habitat conservation
plans prevent a landowner from asserting that
the  ESA regulations deprive him or her of all
economically viable use of property. If the gov-
ernment denies a landowner’s request for a
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of
Forestry: 
The Oregon Supreme Court
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1.  “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”  U.S. Const.
amend.V.
2.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
permit and the restriction only affects a portion
of the property, the whole parcel rule,3 pre-
venting the segmentation of the property, may
further bar relief from the government. Finally,
courts are often reluctant to find a taking
because the prevailing view of the Endangered
Species Act is as a narrow land use restriction,
instead of a permanent prohibition of property
rights.4
The Oregon Supreme Court rejected or
ignored many of these arguments in its 1997
decision in Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry,5
which held that a landowner could prove a reg-
ulatory taking of his or her timberland by com-
plying with Oregon’s logging regulations pro-
tecting the northern spotted owl. Although the
court’s opinion casually glided over many sig-
nificant legal controversies at stake in the case,
the outcome is important for two reasons.
First, by limiting its takings analysis to a por-
tion of the company’s property under an
absolute logging ban, the Oregon Supreme
Court signaled the demise of the whole parcel
rule within the State of Oregon. Second, by
finding the state’s protection of the threatened
species to be a regulatory taking, the court
effectively embraced the conscription theory of
per se takings. 
This paper first examines the factual and
procedural history of Boise Cascade and the
Oregon Supreme Court’s reasoning regarding
the whole parcel rule and the conscription the-
ory of takings. Next, this paper addresses the
hurdles that remain for landowners seeking
relief for takings by the government under the
ESA. Finally, the paper discusses how takings
claims are not only possible, but also an
appropriate means of addressing overreaching
land use restrictions under the Endangered
Species Act. 
II. Factual Background
Boise Cascade (“Boise”) acquired 1,770
acres of commercial timberland6 in Clatsop
County, Oregon, in 1988. That same year, the
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife listed
the northern spotted owl as a threatened
species. In 1990, the State Forester adopted a
policy prohibiting logging within 70 acres of
northern spotted owl nesting sites. The next
year, Boise sold all but 64 acres of the tract.
The buyer refused to purchase the 64-acre par-
cel because of the presence of an owl nest on
the site. In 1992, Boise filed a proposal to log
the 64 acres, which the Oregon Department of
Forestry (“Department”) denied because the
plan did not provide adequate refuge for the
threatened owl. A few months later, Boise sub-
mitted an amended plan for the property,
which the Department also denied. However,
the Department advised the company that it
could log eight acres of the tract within certain
time constraints.7
After the Department’s second denial
of its logging plan, Boise filed an
inverse condemnation suit in state
court, alleging the denial constituted
a taking of its 56-acres. In 1993, Boise,
following the Department’s sugges-
tion, filed a plan to log four of the
eight acres previously authorized. The
Department approved the plan, but
limited Boise’s ability to log the prop-
erty to a six-month time period during
the rainy season. Boise then filed a
second complaint, alleging a tempo-
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3.  See generally infra Part III for definition and discussion of
the whole parcel principle.
4. See Robert Meltz, Cong. Res. Serv., The Endangered
Species Act and Private Property: A Legal Primer (1993) (“A key
reason why courts are not finding constitutional takings is
because until now they have deemed the restrictions in wildlife
statutes to be land-use controls, rather than to effect permanent
physical occupations by the protected animals. . . . For this and
other reasons (but stressing the difficulty of prediction in this
area), it seems that few ESA impacts on private property are like-
ly to be constitutionally compensable.”).  
5.  Boise Cascade Corp. v. Bd. of Forestry, 935 P.2d 411 (Or.
1997) (“Boise II”).
6.  The tract is zoned as commercial timberland and com-
mercial activities on the land are limited to forest operations
relating to the growing and harvesting of trees.  Boise Cascade
Corp. v. Bd. of Forestry, 886 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Or.  Ct.. App.  1994)
(“Boise I”).
7.  Boise Cascade Corp. v. State, 991 P.2d 563, 564-65 (Or. Ct.
App.  1999) (“Boise III”) 
8.  Id. at 565.
The State moved to dismiss both com-
plaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
ripeness and failure to state a claim. The circuit
court granted the motion, which the Court of
Appeals reversed.9 The Oregon Supreme Court
granted review, and affirmed in part and
reversed in part.10 The court found Boise
alleged sufficient facts to show the Department
deprived it of all economic viable use of the 54-
acre tract but failed to allege a temporary tak-
ing of the four acres because the logging
restriction was not “permanent on its face or so
long lived as to make any present economic
plans for the property impractical.”11
The case was remanded to the circuit court,
which granted partial summary judgment on
the regulatory taking of the 56 acres. A jury
returned a verdict in favor of Boise, concluding
that Boise’s property was taken by “physical
invasion,” under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.,12 and that damages were appropri-
ate.13 The circuit court entered judgment for
$2,279,223, which the State appealed.14 On
appeal, the state appellate court agreed with
the State that the Loretto theory was inappli-
cable, but found the trial court properly grant-
ed summary judgment on the regulatory tak-
ing.15 However, it found the trial court erred in
striking the State’s defense of ripeness because
there was no indication it would be futile for
Boise to pursue an incidental take permit.16
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded
the case.17
III. The Whole Parcel Rule
A taking occurs when a government regula-
tion deprives a property owner of all economi-
cally viable use of his or her property.18
Because this test for a “regulatory taking”
requires a comparison of “the value that has
been taken from the property with the value
that remains in the property, one of the critical
questions is determining how to define the
unit of property ‘whose value is to furnish the
denominator of the fraction.’”19 In many cases,
this issue is decided by applying the whole par-
cel rule – an analysis of the impact on the
property as a whole rather than on individual
affected segments.
The Supreme Court established the whole
parcel rule in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City,20 where it refused to consider the
deprivation of “air rights” above a building as
separate from the whole property. “’Taking’
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to deter-
mine whether rights in a particular segment
have been entirely abrogated.”21 Instead,
according to the Court, it must look at the
impact of the government interference on the
“parcel as a whole.”22
However, fourteen years later, the Supreme
Court called the whole parcel rule into ques-
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9.  Boise I, 886 P.2d at 1035.
10.  Boise II, 935 P.2d at 416.  Neither the Oregon Supreme
Court, in Boise II, nor the appellate court, in Boise I, addressed the
State’s ripeness argument because it concerned both legal and
factual issues that could not be answered based on the record.
Id. at 416 n.7; Boise I, 886 P.2d at 1035 n.2.  This issue would later
be key in the Court of Appeals’ decision to reverse and remand
the jury’s finding of a taking in Boise III, 991 P.2d at 571.
11.  Boise II, 935 P.2d at 420–21.
12.  458 U.S. 419 (1982).
13.  Boise III, 991 P.2d at 565.
14.  Id.  During the court proceedings, one of the owls on the
Boise property died and the other left the site.  Given the absence
of the threatened species, the logging restrictions were lifted.
The damage award was for the temporary taking of the 56 acres
during the time period the logging restrictions were in place.  Id. 
15.  Id. at 570.
16.  Id. at 574.
17. Id. Boise appealed the decision, which the Oregon
Supreme Court denied on October 24, 2000.  Boise Cascade Corp.
v. Bd. of Forestry, 331 Or. 244, 18 P.2d 1099 (Oct. 24, 2000).
18.  Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
19.  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
20.  438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
21.  Id. at 130.
22.  Id. at 130–31.
23.  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7
(1992).  For an even earlier rejection of the whole parcel rule, see
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 186–87 (1928) (analyz-
ing for takings purposes the 29,000 affected by the zoning regula-
tion separately from the 140,000 total feet held by the property
owner).
quate.23 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
the Supreme Court noted its requirement of a
“deprivation of all economically feasible use”
provides no guidance as to the property inter-
est for measuring this diminution.24 Although
the Court expressed concern about how the
lower courts and even its own opinions have
inconsistently assessed the value and use of an
affected property,25 it refused to provide more
than a conjecture that state law may govern
this issue.26 Thus, while the “whole parcel” or
“denominator” problem remains an unsettled
issue, it may not necessarily stand as an obsta-
cle in bringing takings claims based on land
use regulations, including the ESA, as Boise II
illustrates.
In Boise II, the Oregon Supreme Court effec-
tively ignored the whole parcel rule and con-
cluded that it is proper to consider the 56-acre
and 4-acre tracts owned by Boise separately for
a taking analysis.27
With respect to the first claim for relief, the
plaintiff has alleged “depriv[ation] . . . of the
only economically viable use of approximately
56 acres of merchantable timber.” Assuming
the truth of all well-pleaded facts alleged in the
complaint and giving plaintiff the benefit of all
favorable inferences that may be drawn from
those facts, that allegation is sufficient to meet
the “deprivation of all economically viable use
of the property” standard.28
The court cited no authority for this dra-
matic decision to segregate the 56-acre tract
with the absolute logging prohibition from the
remaining eight acres that could be logged
under specified circumstances. Moreover, the
court’s conclusion that a taking would occur if
Boise proves such facts appears to contradict
its assertion that there is no taking if “the
owner has ‘some substantial beneficial use’ of
the property remaining.” 29
The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in
Boise II appears less shocking, however, when
one considers how the Oregon Supreme Court
and others have grappled with this issue else-
where. For example, the Oregon Supreme
Court relied upon its decision in Fifth Avenue
Corp. v. Washington Co.30 to require Boise to
allege the logging restriction deprives it of “all
economically viable use of the property.”31
This case sheds some light on where the Boise
II court gets its segmentation principle. In Fifth
Avenue Corp., the Oregon Supreme Court ana-
lyzed whether zoning laws constitute a taking
of an owner’s property. However, before the
court began its takings analysis, it found it
“must divide the subject property into two sep-
arate parcels” according to the different regula-
tions imposed on each.32 Because each parcel
was zoned for specific uses, the segmentation
was necessary to determine whether the spe-
cific zoning designation deprived the landown-
er of all use of that portion of the property.33
Since the government regulated each parcel
differently, the court was required to analyze
the taking of each parcel differently.
The Ninth Circuit also adopted the Fifth
Avenue Corp. segmentation principle in American
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. County of Marin.34 There, a
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24.  505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
25.  Id. (“For an extreme — and, we think, unsupportable —
view of the relevant calculus, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 333-334, 397 N.Y.S. 2d 914, 920, 366
N.E.2d 1271, 1276-1277 (1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646,
57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978), where the state court examined the
diminution in a particular parcel’s value produced by a municipal
ordinance in light of total value of the takings claimant’s other
holdings in the vicinity.”).
26.  See id. “The answer to this difficult question may lie in
how the owner’s reasonable expectations have been shaped by
the State’s law of property — i.e., whether and to what degree the
State’s law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the
particular interest in land with respect to which the takings
claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value.” Id.
27.  935 P.2d 411, 420 (Or. 1997).
28.  Id.
29. Id. (citing Dodd v. Hood River County, 855 P.2d 608
(1993)).
30.  581 P.2d 50 (Or. 1978).
31.  Boise II, 935 P.2d at 419.
32.  Fifth Avenue Corp., 581 P.2d at 60.
33.  Id. Although the court did find a cause of action for
inverse condemnation based on the restrictions on one parcel
could be stated, it did not reach the takings issues since the
plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
34.  653 F.2d 364, 370 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Nectow, 277 U.S.
at 187; Fifth Avenue Corp., 581 P.2d at 60).
property when the county zoned two contigu-
ous sections at different density levels. Based
on the available facts, the court was unable to
determine whether the two parcels would be
developed differently, so as to make the zoning
distinction significant, and it remanded the
case.35 However, the Ninth Circuit held that if
the plaintiff was able to show the two parcels
would be “treated separately when its develop-
ment plans are submitted and considered,”
then the portion at issue “must be analyzed as
a separate parcel for taking purposes.”36
Similarly, California courts have embraced
this principle in the land use setting. The Court
of Appeal, in Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of
Santa Cruz, expressly adopted the standard
established by the Ninth Circuit and restricted
its analysis to the portion affected by the zon-
ing regulation.37 Likewise, in Twain Hart
Associates, Ltd. v. County of Tuolumne, the court
refused to adopt a rule urged by the county
that the economic effect of a zoning regulation
should be analyzed based on a developer’s
entire 8.5-acre parcel, not the 1.7-acre plot
directly affected by the restriction.38 Such a
rule, the court concluded, would run contrary
to the cases where “the nature of a particular
land use regulation has been recognized as
potentially creating separate parcels for ‘tak-
ing’ purposes.”39
Accordingly, the Oregon Supreme Court’s
decision in Boise II is consistent with takings
jurisprudence in the land use setting. Where
the government regulates portions of an
owner’s property differently, the court must
analyze the parcels differently for takings pur-
poses.40 Through its denials and qualified
approvals, the Department effectively “zoned”
Boise’s 64 acres of commercial timberland – no
use for 56 acres and restricted use for the
remaining eight. By regulating the portions dif-
ferently, the Department opened itself up to
takings claim for each portion. The value of the
whole parcel cannot be appropriately or lawful-
ly analyzed where land use regulations restrict
isolated portions of the property.41
Moreover, the court’s decision to dismiss
the whole parcel rule corresponds with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas. There, the
Court suggested the determination of the rela-
tive property interest affected by the land use
restriction is an issue of state law.42 In other
words, state law recognition of property rights
and an owner’s expectations based thereupon
establish the parcel affected for diminution
purposes.43 Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court
simply followed the Lucas directive by applying
state property law, as established by Fifth
Avenue Corp., to require the segmentation of the
timberland according to the restrictions
imposed.
IV. Conscription Theory of Per Se Takings
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court adopted
an ad hoc, fact-based approach to takings
claims.44 This method, however, has led to
much confusion and criticism among the lower
courts and commentators. Thus, in an attempt
to clarify and streamline takings jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court has adopted a few “per se”
analyses.  Such per se takings include the
physical occupation of private property by the
government45 and the total deprivation of all
economically viable use of the property by gov-
ernment regulation.46 If the Supreme Court
gets the opportunity, it may add another area
of per se takings to its jurisprudence – the con-
scriptive taking.
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35.  Id. at 372.
36.  Id.
37.  138 Cal. App. 3d 484, 496 (1982).
38.  217 Cal. App. 3d 71, 85 (1990).
39.  Id.
40.  See Fifth Avenue Corp., 581 P.2d at 60.
41.  See id.
42.  See 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
43.  See id.
44.  438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
45.  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982).
46.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
an extension of the physical taking established
by Loretto.47 A physical taking occurs when the
government actually occupies or appropriates
the private property. Under the conscription
theory, the government does not physically
take the property, but instead institutes land
use controls for a public purpose that amount
to the destruction of the owner’s interest in the
land. In other words, the government has
imposed use restrictions so severe that it
might as well have actually occupied the prop-
erty.
The conscription theory first surfaced in
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis.48
The case involved a Pennsylvania law that pro-
hibited the mining of coal in the support estate
in order to protect the health and safety of the
public.49 A five-member majority upheld the
law against a facial takings challenge, finding
the public interest in preventing public nui-
sances and the lack of a showing of total
diminution of property value prevented a tak-
ing.50
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
Powell, O’Connor and Scalia, strongly dis-
agreed with the majority’s result. Noting that
the coal in the support estate is a separate
property interest under state law that derives
its value from the ability to mine it,51
Rehnquist considered this to be a per se taking
based on government conscription of private
property:
From the relevant perspective – that
of the property owners – this interest
has been destroyed every bit as much
as if the government had proceeded
to mine the coal for its own use. The
regulation, then, does not merely
inhibit one strand in the bundle . . .
but instead destroys completely any
interest in a segment of property. In
these circumstances, I think it unnec-
essary to consider whether petitioner
may operate individual mines or their
overall mining operation profitably, for
they have been denied all use of 27
million tons of coal. I would hold that
. . . [the law] works a taking of these
property interests.52
Although this takings theory based on gov-
ernment conscription is part of a dissenting
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s analysis like-
ly would be law today if the opportunity arises.
With the addition of Justice Thomas, Chief
Justice Rehnquist would have a five-member
majority for his conscription, or “usings,”53
holding. Accordingly, due to the current make-
up of the Court, the conscription theory of per
se takings is effectively good law despite the
lack of majority precedent.
Moreover, the conscription theory of tak-
ings has historical support from Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, the landmark case that estab-
lished regulatory takings – claims based on
government action that “goes too far.”54 Sixty-
four years before Keystone but with nearly iden-
tical facts, Pennsylvania Coal was an “as-applied”
challenge to Pennsylvania’s Kohler Act. As in
Keystone, the Act prohibited the mining of coal
in the support estate. However, Justice
Holmes, writing for the majority in Pennsylvania
Coal, found the law constituted a taking
because it destroyed the total value of a sepa-
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47.  458 U.S. at 421.
48.  480 U.S. 470 (1986).
49.  Id. at 476-77, 485-86.
50.  Id. at 492-93.
51. Id. at 517-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (“[T]he
right to coal consists in the right to mine it.”)).
52.  Id. at 518.
53.  Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale L.J. 1077, 1080 (1993).
Professor Rubenfeld adopted the term “usings” to refer to cir-
cumstances “when government conscripts someone’s property
for state use” without compensation.  Id. This is essentially the
same takings theory as conscription by government regulation.
54.  260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
55.  Id. at 414-15.  Arguably, Keystone overruled the holding
in Pennsylvania Coal, given the similar fact pattern yet dissimilar
outcomes.  However, Justice Stevens takes great pains in Keystone
to distinguish Pennsylvania Coal, noting the earlier Kohler Act
served only private interests and made it commercially impracti-
cable to mine the coal.  See 480 U.S. at 484-85.  Justice Stevens
concluded the current law served broader public interests and
the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of any specific economic
impact, thus there could be no taking in Keystone. Id. at 485-86.
This economic-impact analysis laid the
foundation for the Court’s later approach in
Lucas,56 but it may be a misunderstanding to
interpret the Court’s holding as based solely on
the economic impact of the Kohler Act.
Instead, what likely upset Justice Holmes was
the conscriptive effect of the Act.57 The Court’s
previous takings decisions58 upheld “regula-
tions directed at some perceived harm [that]
do not . . . use the property they regulate; they
merely proscribe a use to the owner or restrict
him in exercising a use of his own choosing.”59
In comparison, the Kohler Act did not require
the destruction of property to avoid a public
harm, but required the company to put its
property to state-mandated purpose of sup-
porting others’ structures. This government
action making “it commercially impracticable
to mine certain coal has very nearly the same
effect for constitutional purposes as appropri-
ating . . . it.”60 In other words, Pennsylvania had
conscripted the company’s property for a pub-
lic use.
The Oregon Supreme Court does not
expressly use Rehnquist’s dissent in Keystone,
Pennsylvania Coal or any related takings jurispru-
dence to find Boise could establish a taking of
its property by the state’s ESA-related regula-
tions. Instead, the court relies on a Lucas-like
approach, requiring Boise to allege a total dep-
rivation of the economically viable use of the
property.61 However, by finding the state’s land
use restriction may equate a taking, the court
has effectively embraced the conscription the-
ory of per se takings.
In Boise II, the Oregon Supreme Court notes
that under state law there are two ways gov-
ernment action may result in a taking of private
property.62 First, a taking occurs “when a pres-
ent governmental action creates an expecta-
tion that the private land in question eventual-
ly will be taken for a public use.”63 Second, a
taking “by inverse condemnation occurs when
the government acts to ‘intervene[] to straight-
en out situations in which the citizenry is in
conflict over land use or where one person’s
use of his land is injurious to other.’”64 The
court does not explain under which category of
takings Boise’s claim falls. However, this dis-
tinction may be irrelevant, since either situa-
tion, according to the court, requires the show-
ing of a complete deprivation of economic
value of the property.65
Oregon’s ESA-related regulations imposed
an absolute ban on the logging of 56 acres of
Boise’s timberland and significant time con-
straints on the logging of four acres of its prop-
erty.66 By agreeing with Boise’s assertion that
the property interest in timberland is based on
the right to log it, the court found the compa-
ny sufficiently alleged the deprivation “of the
only economically viable use of approximately
56 acres of merchantable timber.”67 Under Lucas
and its progeny, this total diminution in value
is a taking.68
However, the court’s holding works even
better under the conscription theory. For con-
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56.  505 U.S. 1003, 1014-15 (1992).
57.  Rubenfeld, supra note 53, at 1113.
58.  See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
59.  Rubenfeld, supra note 53, at 1113.
60.  Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414.  Justice Holmes’
original quote uses the phrase “appropriating or destroying it.”  Id.
(emphasis added).  Professor Rubenfeld focused on this disjunc-
tive phrase to conclude Pennsylvania Coal can be viewed as either
an economic-impact case (where the government destroys the
value of the property) or a conscription case (where the govern-
ment appropriates the property by land use controls).  Rubenfeld,
supra note 53, at 1113.
61.  Boise Cascade Corp. v. Bd. of Forestry, 935 P.2d 411, 419-
20 (Or. 1997) (“Boise II”).  
62.  Id. at 419.
63.  Id.
64.  Id. at 420 (quoting Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co.,
581 P.2d 50 (Or. 1978)).
65.  Id. at 419-20.
66.  Boise Cascade Corp. v. State, 991 P.2d 563, 564-65 (Or.
App. Ct. 1999) (“Boise III”).
67.  Boise II, 935 P.2d at 420.  It is interesting that the Oregon
Supreme Court does not even dispute Boise’s claim that its prop-
erty has no value if it is unable to log it.  This lack of analysis is
hardly surprising, given the court’s overall brevity in addressing
the other legal arguments for the takings claim.  Moreover, it
lends support to the idea that the court is really applying a con-
scription theory since a Lucas-based approach normally requires
more of an economic analysis.
68.  505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
refers to it, the significant factor is whether the
government is requiring a parcel be put to a
specific public use, not necessarily whether the
government action is depriving the landowner
of value.69 Here, Oregon’s restrictions were
necessary for the preservation of the habitat of
the threatened northern spotted owl, a pro-
tected species under the state and federal
ESA.70 By imposing severe land use controls
on Boise’s property, Oregon was requiring the
timberland to be used for the state purpose of
protecting the owl. From this perspective,
Oregon’s restrictions destroyed Boise’s proper-
ty interest “every bit as much as if the govern-
ment had proceeded to [log it] for its own
use.”71 In other words, Oregon conscripted
Boise’s property for a public use. 
Accordingly, the Oregon Supreme Court’s
decision in Boise II is consistent with United
States Supreme Court “precedent” of conscrip-
tive takings. The outcome mirrors Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s Keystone dissent and the Court’s
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal. Thus, the Boise II
decision is not groundbreaking, but instead a
logical extension of established takings
jurisprudence.
More significantly, Boise II illustrates that the
effect of a government-imposed use may be as
important, or even more, as the diminution of
value caused by the regulation. This is especial-
ly important for ESA-related regulations, where
the government requires a parcel be used for
species preservation and a coinciding but less
profitable private use still exists for the proper-
ty. According to Boise II, Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Pennsylvania Coal, such conscription of pri-
vate property may still be a taking because the
government has dictated a use for the property
and has deprived the owner of full interest in the
property. Such controls have the same effect as
a government appropriation of the property
and, thus, equate a taking of private property.
V. Hurdles to Takings Claims Under the ESA
The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in
Boise II72 is a good example of how takings
claims can be brought against ESA-related reg-
ulations, despite issues of segmentation and
diminution of value. In contrast, the Oregon
Court of Appeals decision in Boise III73 is a good
example of the hurdles that still exist for
landowners seeking relief from the government
for overreaching ESA restrictions. Key among
these hurdles is the issue of ripeness.
Like its doctrinal sisters standing and
mootness, ripeness has its foundation in
Article III of the Constitution, which requires
federal courts hear only “cases or controver-
sies.”74 However, ripeness also has two pruden-
tial requirements for regulatory takings
claims.75 First, a plaintiff must show he or she
received a final decision from the administrat-
ing agency regarding the application of the reg-
ulations to his or her property. Second, a plain-
tiff must seek compensation through the pro-
cedures, if any, established under state law for
such takings claims.76
For a property owner seeking relief from
ESA-related regulations, the ability to apply for
incidental take permits and habitat conserva-
tion plans prevents the property owner from
demonstrating the prudential considerations
of the ripeness doctrine. For example, in Boise
III, the Oregon Court of Appeals found Boise’s
taking claim was not ripe since it did not seek
an incidental take permit from the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service before filing
the claim.77 With an incidental take permit,
Boise likely would have been able to kill the
owls or destroy their habitat without violating
the ESA. However, even if Boise had an inci-
dental take permit, Oregon was under no obli-
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court did not find such uncertainty a problem,
noting Supreme Court cases do not require a
possible alternative or waiver to be a “sure
thing” to satisfy the ripeness doctrine.79 Even if
it was unlikely that Oregon would approve the
logging of the 56 acres, the court found that
Boise had to apply for the permit in order to
meet the prudential requirement of the
ripeness doctrine.80
Although no reported federal opinions
have prohibited judicial consideration of an
ESA-based takings claim because of the failure
to pursue an incidental take permit,81 the Boise
III analysis is consistent with recent Supreme
Court decisions and is likely the prevailing rule
on the issue today.82 Other courts have
imposed the same requirement on landown-
ers. For example, in Four Points Utility Joint
Venture v. United States, a federal court dismissed
a takings claim where the plaintiff also failed to
seek an incidental take permit before filing
suit.83 By requiring these takings claims to be
ripe, the courts are avoiding speculating
whether the administrative agencies would
have allowed the projects or activities to go
forward if the incidental take permits had been
granted.84
However, the ripeness doctrine may not be
an insurmountable hurdle for landowners.
Some courts have declined to require plaintiffs
to seek incidental take permits before takings
claims can be ripe. For example, in SDS Lumber
Co. v. State of Washington,85 a jury awarded $2 mil-
lion to a lumber company for a taking claim
brought under logging restrictions similar to
those faced by Boise.86 The trial court rejected
the State of Washington’s assertion that the
taking claim was not ripe because the compa-
ny failed to seek an incidental take permit.87
Moreover, property owners can take advan-
tage of the futility exception to the ripeness
doctrine. If a property owner can show any and
all applications would be denied, he or she
need not pursue a permit or agency approval at
all for a claim to be ripe.88 In Lucas, the
Supreme Court did not require the landowner
to apply for a building permit before filing suit,
noting such an application would be futile
because “the Council stipulated . . . that no
building permit would have been issued . . .
application or no application.”89 Under the
ESA, a plaintiff can demonstrate futility by
either showing the Fish and Wildlife Service
would never issue an incidental take permit
under such circumstances or the administrat-
ing agency would still deny a project or activity
with an incidental take permit. Boise attempt-
ed this route in Boise III, but did not properly
demonstrate its claim.90
Another hurdle that remains for property
owners with ESA-based takings claims is the
general perception that the ESA merely impos-
es a land use control, rather than permanent
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controls are rarely held to constitute a taking
and landowners have difficulty procuring com-
pensation for such effects.92 This hurdle is
somewhat lessened by interpreting ESA-based
takings claims under a conscription theory
rather than a Lucas-style approach, since for
conscriptive takings, the court analyzes the
appropriating effect of the government regula-
tion rather than the diminution of property
value.93
Oregon has also attempted to minimize
this hurdle with the passage of Measure 7, a
significant takings public referendum. Measure
7, a constitutional amendment, compels state
and local governments to compensate
landowners for any diminution of property
value resulting from state and local regula-
tions.94 Measure 7 exempts “historically and
commonly recognized nuisance laws” from its
reimbursement requirements. However, the
measure does apply retroactively, so property
owners that have continuously owned their
properties since regulations have been
imposed would be able to apply for compensa-
tion.95
On November 7, 2000, the people of
Oregon voted to approve Measure 7, 53-per-
cent to 47-percent.96 Despite this wide margin
of approval, the opposition to Measure 7 has
been extremely vocal, especially from local
governments fearing they can no longer enact
land use regulations without depleting their
coffers through compensation payments.
Several parties have filed lawsuits to block
Measure 7 from taking effect.97 Responding to
one such suit, Marion County Circuit Court
Judge Paul Lipscomb granted a motion on
December 6, 2000, to temporarily bar the law
from taking effect to address challenges that
the measure was not adopted in a manner con-
sistent with the Oregon Constitution.98
Whether Measure 7 will actually take effect
is now in doubt. The measure, along with sim-
ilar, although not as far-reaching, laws adopted
by Florida and Texas,99 represents a general
recognition that land use controls may
decrease property values and erode owners’
interests in their lands. This is especially
important for takings claims under ESA-related
state regulations, where the government con-
trols are not merely zoning laws created for
aesthetic or consistency purposes, but instead
are requirements of private owners to put their
properties to an albeit important, but also
public, use. Since even such severe land use
controls are often not viewed as compensa-
ble,100 state enactments such as Measure 7 are
often necessary to overcome this hurdle and
ensure private owners are not exploited in the
name of the public good.
VI. Appropriate Takings Claims Under
the ESA
The Oregon Supreme Court decision in
Boise II101 illustrates an important and sweep-
ing proposition – that takings claims are an
appropriate means to address overreaching
ESA regulations. It is appropriate to address
overreaching ESA regulations through a takings
claim. Although this seems to be a simple and
hardly groundbreaking idea – Justice Holmes
certainly would agree that an ESA regulation
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– many commentators have disputed the use
of the Fifth Amendment to address property
issues under the ESA.103
Prime among many commentators’ con-
cerns is the common law nuisance principle
that prevents a landowner from claiming
immunity from species protection laws.104 The
Supreme Court in Lucas reiterated this princi-
ple by stating laws that merely repeat limita-
tions contained in the title of the property, as
defined by state nuisance laws, cannot consti-
tute a taking.105 According to Glenn Sugameli,
“[l]aws protecting and regulating wildlife are a
traditional, common component of state prop-
erty law and state police powers,” thus cannot
be the basis of a takings claim.106
Moreover, Sugameli notes, even if a takings
claim does not invoke the nuisance law princi-
ple, there are other reasons why ESA-related
regulations do not cause takings issues:
First, it is not a taking to regulate only
part of the “parcel as a whole,” in
terms of acreage or of time. Second,
prohibiting only particular uses of
land, while permitting others, does
not cause a taking. . . . Finally, species
protection typically includes case-by-
case flexibility and no property has
been taken from those who obtain
variances or permits that allow activi-
ties that incidentally “take” (harm)
protected wildlife.107
Sugameli’s comments are applicable to
factual situations such as in Christy v. Hodel,
where the landowner was attempting to claim
protected bears were actually government
agents that physically occupied his property,
Loretto-style.108 However, his argument has little
impact in a case such as Boise II, where the land
use controls actually conscript a private
owner’s property and prohibit a long-standing
and proper use of the land. In such cases, a tak-
ings claim is an appropriate and necessary
means of addressing such regulations for sev-
eral reasons.
First and foremost, Boise was not seeking
an exemption from any common law principle
preventing the destruction of a public
resource. The company was trying to use its
property in the method proscribed by state law
– logging.109 In Boise III, the state attempted to
use the nuisance proposition from Lucas to
claim it cannot be liable to the company for
refusing to permit activity that would consti-
tute a public nuisance. The court of appeals
rejected the defense, noting there was “no
authority for the proposition that knocking
down a bird’s nest on one’s property has ever
been considered a public nuisance.”111
Second, as discussed in Part III, Boise II
illustrates how the whole parcel rule does not
prevent the court from segmenting a tract of
property according to the differing regulations
imposed. This approach has its support in the
Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Lucas and
in other courts’ analyses of takings claims
under land use regulations.112
Moreover, prohibiting a use of the land
while permitting others can result in a taking if
the government is effectively appropriating the
property for a state-mandated use.113 Although
Boise II does not expressly apply the conscrip-
tion theory of per se takings, the court’s abbre-
viated discussion of the diminution principle
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finding of a conscriptive taking.
Sugameli’s final point, that a case-by-case
analysis of takings claims under ESA-related
regulations discourage claims due to the avail-
ability of variances and incidental take permits,
obviously has impact in cases such as Boise II.
As discussed in Part V, the availability of inci-
dental take permits represent a significant hur-
dle to takings claims, especially under the
ripeness doctrine. In addition, if a landowner is
able to get such a permit, the likelihood of a
takings claim succeeding is remote. However,
this is only an obstacle for plaintiffs to over-
come, not a blanket reason to bar takings
claims altogether under the ESA. Accordingly,
as Boise II demonstrates, landowners should
use the Fifth Amendment to address the con-
scriptive effect of ESA-related regulations and
seek the compensation from the government.
VII. Conclusion
The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry illustrates
how a successful takings claim can be brought
under ESA regulations. By ignoring the whole
parcel rule, the Oregon Supreme Court opened
the door for future claims based on regulations
that affect discrete portions of a property. The
court’s ruling also effectively embraces the
conscription theory of per se takings, allowing
for future claims based on regulations that
appropriate property for a public use, but do
not completely decrease the land’s value.
Although hurdles still exist for ESA-related tak-
ings claims, as evident in the case’s subse-
quent proceedings, even obstacles such as the
ripeness doctrine can be overcome.
Accordingly, Boise II demonstrates that takings
claims under ESA-related regulations are not
only possible, but also represent an appropri-
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